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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
one year after accrual. The executor was not appointed until
sixteen months had elapsed but he filed his notice of intention
within two months and commenced the action within five months
of his appointment. His claim was also filed within the two year
limit afforded by Decedent Estate Law Section 130.
The court in the instant case said:
The Syracuse statute required the filing of a claim within
six months 'after the cause of action shall have accrued' where-
as our section 50-e requires filing within 'ninety days after the
claim arises'. In the Crapo case, the claim which the statute
demanded had to contain not only a statement of the facts
of the accident, but notice also of intention to bring a suit, and
it was held that, since only an administratrix could bring the
suit, only an administratrix could give notice of intention
to sue, and so the time for filing the claim did not start to
run until the administratrix was appointed. The present
claim, however, was preliminary to suit under section 130 of
the Decedent Estate Law, as to which it has been specifically
held that the time runs from death, and we have, also, section
50-e itself, which requires filing of the claim within ninet, days
'after the claim arises'. The Crapo decision is no authority
against our holding here .... [Emphasis added.]
It is the opinion of this writer that the holding of the instant
case Will be strictly confined to its facts and will not be applicable
to the filing of wrongful death claims in general.
VII. DOiESTic RELATIoNs
Separation Agreements
The Court of Appeals this term has, in two cases,' ruled
that a wife is entitled to the full amount stated in a separation
agreement for the support of herself and her children where the
amount stated is unitary and unallocated between herself and the
children and, through no fault of hers, she is no longer support-
ing the children.
The fundamental rule of contracts that a court, as a matter
of law, will look only to the agreement to find intent in an un-
ambiguous contract,2 has always been applied to separation agree-
ments.3 Courts have refused to apportion the total amount
allocated for the support of the wife and the children where the
1. Nichols v. Nichols, 306 N.Y. 490, 119 N.E. 2d 351 (1953); Rehill v. Rehill,
306 N.Y. 126, 116 N.E. 2d 281 (1953).
2. Brainard v. New York Ccnt. R. Co., 242 N. Y. 125, 133 N. E. 152 (1926).
3. Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N.Y. 635, 22 N.E. 1114 (1889) ; Goldman v. Goldinats,
282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. 2d 265 (19401.
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agreement fails to do so and the agreement itself remains un-
impeached.
In addition, when the separation agreement is incorporated
in a divorce decree of a sister state, it becomes part of the decree 5
as in lhe instant cases, and therefore it becomes entitled to full
faith and credit.0 Consequently an allocation can not be made by a
New York court as it would substantially impair the rights estab-
lished in the prior decree.7
VIII. INSURANCE
Airline Trip Insurance
An often noted aspect of modern commercial distribution is
the increased use of automatic vending machines as purveyors
of myriad goods and services. Not the least imaginative use of
these devices is in the sale of short-term policies of specific-risk
life insurance. The attendant consequences of possibly mislead-
ing advertising, and its effect on construction of the insurance
policy, together with the difficulty of applying proverbial doc-
trines of contract law where the offeror is a mechanical agent,
were the subject of decision in Laohs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York.1
Decedent had purchased an insurance policy from such a
machine located in front of the ticket counter at Newark Airport.
In letters ten times larger than any other words on the machine,
prominently lighted, were the words: "Airline Trip Insurance."
This legend was repeated several times in smaller print on the
machine and in the application. Across the face of the policy,
which consisted of twenty-two inches of printed matter, in large
type, appeared the words: "This Policy Is Limited To Aircraft
Accidents Read It Carefully." But the policy was accompanied
by an envelope, presumably to permit the purchaser to mail it
immediately.
The coverage clause in the policy provided that the insurance
would apply only to injuries sustained by reason of a flight on a
"Scheduled Airline", defined in the clause as "a Civilian Sched-
uled Airline maintaining regular, published schedules and licensed
for . . . transportation of passengers . . .
4. Harwood v. Harwood, 182 Misc. 130, 49 N.Y. S. 2d 727, (Sup. Ct), aff'd,
268 App. Div. 974, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 573 (1st Dep't 1944) ; Cogswell v. Cogswell, 130 Misc.
541, 224 N.Y. Supp. 59 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
5. 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 13.51 (2d ed. 1945).
6. 3 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT §§ 33.20, 3324 (2d ed. 1945).
7. Schacht v. Schacht, 295 N.Y. 439, 68 N.E. 2d 433 (1946).
1. 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E. 2d 555 (1954).
